Afghan Campaign Shows Need for a New US Military Policy

The “wikileak” of US military documents related to the Afghan campaign doesn’t really tell us anything perceptive observers had not already figured out – but it does highlight, once again, the need for a clear US policy regarding the use of military force.

The fundamental problems we face in Afghanistan – attempting to win hearts and minds; dealing with timid allies; enemies who have safe havens from which to launch attacks upon us – have been with us ever since the Korean War. In the highest councils of our government and in spite of having, at times, Presidents and generals who understand war, we have had an overall paralysis of will which has prevented the United States from securing clear-cut victory most of the times we have engaged in battle since the Second World War. Only the comparatively minor operations in Grenada and Panama have been fought to a conclusion – and the clear peace resulting from such action stands in stark contrast to the bitter defeat or disappointing half-victories of other conflicts.

In Korea were the bad military seeds planted. First in Truman’s decision to go to war without a clear, Congressional declaration of war. Secondly, and most fatally, in the loss of nerve when things didn’t immediately work out as well as planned. In these two actions came about both the concept that the American people cannot sustain a big war as well as the insane proposition that wars may be fought for limited ends (this last bit had a shred of support from the fact that in the 19th century Bismarck had fought three wars for very strictly limited ends and wound up with a united, powerful Germany dominating the European scene – left out of such considerations were, of course, the dragon’s teeth sewn by those limited wars which united to undo Bismarck’s Germany in World War One). The truth is that both the Civil War and World War Two demonstrated America’s willingness to go all out for victory, while to fight for less than absolute victory is an absurdity no great captain of the past would understand, let alone agree to.

It is America’s leadership which has been unwilling to either declare war or to show courage when things go badly. Because of this unwillingness/cowardice, America’s wars since WWII have tended to be half-fought, and thus rapidly lose support from a public which seems to instinctively know that if you go to war at all, you go all out (and they understood this from the start – the massive, unprecedented outpouring of public support for a relieved General MacArthur in 1951 was testimony to a popular desire to win, once war was started). It is time for us to bring to an and the era of quasi-war for the United States – we have to short-circuit an often faint-hearted leadership, and ensure that if an American soldier is ever engaged in battle from this point on, then his entire nation is absolutely committed to victory regardless of cost.

As a first step, we need to retrieve our war-making power from the Executive Branch. We must pass whatever legislation is necessary to forbid the deployment of US ground forces outside the territory of the United States except during time of declared war. The President must lose his ability to send troops in to battle outside our nation until such time as he obtains specific war powers from Congress. Many will say that this ham strings the United States in times of emergency and to a certain extent they will be correct. But given the baleful effects of leaving this power in the Executive, alone, I think that on balance we’d be better off, even if a US response might be delayed a day or two while Congress gathers to debate and vote upon a war resolution.

The second step must be to prevent a Congressional cut-and-run once the war starts. The cut off of funds by Congress to South Vietnam ensured that our efforts there would end in complete failure; the attempts by Congress to cut off funds for the Iraq campaign nearly caused our complete defeat in that campaign. Once in, we must essentially be forced to stay in until victory is done – and so, legislation must be enacted to ensure that war appropriations can only be refused by a 2/3 vote of both houses.

Once in and committed to funding the fight, we can have some assurance that the war won’t be left half done. We can then look our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the eye and tell them that whatever sacrifice they make, it won’t be for anything less than victory. It will also tell the world that while we might be slower to act than previously, you can rest assured that once we do act, we’re coming in all the way and with everything we’ve got.

We dare not become a fortress trying merely to protect ourselves. But we also cannot become a global 911. Diplomacy and economic activities will play a large roll, as always, but behind words and trade must lie not just a superb US military, but the knowledge that if we un-sheath the sword, it won’t be laid down until the enemy is completely destroyed.

None of this will help us in Afghanistan. For good or ill, the plan and forces we have in place now will have to do the best they can. The troops there deserve our support – but once we do finish in Afghanistan, we should pledge ourselves that will be the last such war we fight. Next time when faced with an insurgency supported by a Third Party, we’ll have to steel ourselves to taking on the sponsors, as well as the terrorists – in any fight, the enemy will know that war with us means ultimate destruction for them.

War is a terrible thing and should not be engaged in save for the weightiest of reasons – but once we determine that war is the only means of securing our interests, then it must be war to the bitter end.